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Abstract 
With pressures growing on international rules, Jacinda Ardern’s 
new government faces extra challenges in shaping a principled 
New Zealand foreign policy based on the consistent assertion of 
values. Many of these external challenges are being felt in Asia. Even 
if force can be avoided on the Korean peninsula, escalating tariff 
competition between the United States and China may signal deep 
challenges for the rules of the road that suit New Zealand. As the 
wider storm clouds grow, the Ardern government’s focus on the 
South Pacific in cooperation with Australia offers some respite. But 
the Labour–New Zealand First coalition may complicate the delivery 
of predictable and creditable foreign policy stances.
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In its briefing document for Winston 
Peters, the incoming minister of foreign 
affairs, the country’s diplomats made 
no bones about the challenges ahead: 
‘New Zealand is pursuing its interests in 
a turbulent environment where the risks 
for small countries are acute’ (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p.6). 
This article provides a snapshot of 
some of New Zealand’s leading 
international policy challenges and what 
these mean for Wellington’s international 
policy preferences. As the reader will note, 
many of these external challenges are 
occurring in the Asia–Pacific region. This 
is not only the location for many of New 
Zealand’s most significant interests. It is 
also the region where the Ardern 
government will need to work doubly hard 
to find partners sharing at least some of 
Wellington’s international priorities.
Regional peace
The first of New Zealand’s regional interests 
is the preservation of interstate peace in 
Asia. To this positive condition is closely 
linked the regional prosperity which has 
allowed New Zealand companies to pursue 
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New Zealand general election outcomes are seldom shaped by foreign policy debates. No 
exception to this rule is the changed 
political landscape which has produced 
Jacinda Ardern’s Labour-led coalition 
government. The new prime minister’s 
rise was propelled by domestic political 
concerns about housing, child poverty and 
income inequality. But the new coalition 
has also taken office at a time of serious 
doubt and fluidity in international politics. 
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trade and investment opportunities in a 
favourable regional environment. But at 
the time of New Zealand’s general election 
in September 2017, concern was growing 
about a possible war over North Korea’s 
accelerating nuclear weapons programme. 
The United States intelligence community 
was on the cusp of judging that Kim Jong-
Un’s regime could bring a nuclear-armed 
intercontinental ballistic missile back 
into the earth’s atmosphere and deliver 
a nuclear weapon onto a continental 
American target. Newly inaugurated 
president Donald Trump had asserted that 
this North Korean breakthrough would 
not happen on his watch. And he seemed 
intent on doing more than matching 
Kim’s outlandish rhetoric. Trump gave the 
appearance of being willing to use force to 
roll back North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
ambitions. 
Such a violent development could have 
grave implications for New Zealand and its 
regional partners. Even an initially limited 
use of force by the United States designed 
to destroy some of North Korea’s missiles 
and warheads could lead to a quickly 
escalating armed conflict. Many expect that 
North Korea would respond with a barrage 
of artillery attacks on nearby South Korea 
at the very least. But if it believed that an 
American attack was imminent, North 
Korea might act first. And even if it waited 
for the US to initiate a conflict, North Korea 
might decide that it needed to use its 
nuclear weapons early before it loses the 
chance to do so.
As North Korea’s ally, China would face 
some very difficult choices in any of these 
scenarios. If Beijing did enter a growing 
war, this would mean New Zealand’s largest 
trading partner was involved in a violent 
conflict with the most powerful of New 
Zealand’s traditional security partners. In 
the event that Australia came good on 
indications that it would support the 
United States should war break out 
(Dziedzic, 2017), New Zealand would have 
even less scope for staying on the sidelines, 
militarily as well as diplomatically.
It is a statement of the glaringly obvious 
that New Zealand’s preference is for a 
negotiated settlement which avoids 
violence on the peninsula. Ardern’s 
immediate predecessor as prime minister, 
Bill English, observed that an especially 
volatile example of Trump’s rhetorical 
pressure on North Korea was ‘not helpful’. 
This sentiment was noticed internationally 
(Nelson, 2017). As a middle ground 
between proper disarmament negotiations, 
which have often seemed unlikely, and the 
use of violent force, which seems potentially 
catastrophic, New Zealand has supported 
the use of economic sanctions to place 
pressure on Pyongyang. That also means 
welcoming any sign of US–China 
cooperation to facilitate that sanctions 
pressure, including in Trump’s early 
interactions with China’s leader Xi Jinping. 
In her first speech on foreign policy 
since becoming prime minister, Ardern 
returned to a familiar Labour theme in 
relation to the North Korea–US stand-off: 
New Zealand’s commitment to multilateral 
nuclear disarmament (Ardern, 2018a). This 
approach, she has suggested, gives 
Wellington a particular angle on this vexing 
example of nuclear proliferation. Her 
government can be expected to give even 
stronger attention to the nuclear 
disarmament treaty that the Key–English 
government supported at the United 
Nations General Assembly. But there is a 
long distance between this universalistic 
(and hopeful) approach and the particular 
kind of diplomacy Trump and Kim may 
have in mind if a meeting between them 
goes ahead. 
Any such discussion is unlikely to 
resolve the conundrum of North Korea’s 
desire to retain nuclear weapons as the best 
chance of regime survival and international 
leverage. Unless Trump pulls off a miracle 
(even less likely it would seem than Ronald 
Reagan’s arms reduction progress with 
Gorbachev), we may be back to a more 
hazardous drawing board. With Trump’s 
Cabinet becoming more hawkish since the 
departure of Gary Cohn, Rex Tillerson and 
H.R. McMaster, possibly only defense 
secretary Mattis would stand in the way of 
a risky use of force by the United States, 
which would likely end several decades of 
interstate peace in north Asia. 
Regional prosperity
Armed conflict on the Korean peninsula 
would be a severe test for US–China 
relations. New Zealand’s continuing 
hopes for regional stability have assumed 
significant common interests between these 
two great powers. This has been a plausible 
hope: Beijing and Washington have long 
had shared interests in Asia’s remarkable 
economic expansion. New Zealand has 
also benefited from the choices made by 
the vast majority of Asian economies to 
embrace global trade and investment. 
Some of the most recent and largest of these 
benefits have come from China’s increasing 
participation in global markets. But it has 
also been in New Zealand’s interests for 
established Western economies, including 
the United States, to remain active in the 
region and remain committed to an open 
and rules-based international trading and 
investment system. 
That both China and the United States 
have supported pathways to closer regional 
economic integration need not produce an 
economically competitive environment, 
forcing New Zealand to make all-or-
nothing choices. Wellington’s approach has 
been to embrace as many of these options 
as possible. Fears of overdependence on 
one large partner have been balanced by 
the commitment of the other: Wellington 
... both China and the United States 
have supported pathways to closer 
regional economic integration need not 
produce an economically competitive 
environment, forcing New Zealand to 
make all-or-nothing choices.
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would have found it more challenging to 
endorse China’s Belt and Road initiative, 
for example, had it not been for America’s 
active participation in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). 
This favourable equilibrium was tested 
by the Trump administration’s decision to 
withdraw the United States from the TPP 
process. In this new situation, Bill English’s 
government was happy to accept the 
prospect of Japan, the largest remaining 
economy in the group of 11, becoming the 
TPP’s unofficial leader. But National-led 
governments were unencumbered by 
serious doubts about the virtues of this 
high-profile trade agreement. This was not 
Ardern’s situation. Labour was unhappy 
with some of the TPP’s more contentious 
clauses, and its two political partners, New 
Zealand First and the Greens, held even 
greater reservations. 
In the final negotiations, which 
produced the more inclusively named CP 
(Comprehensive and Progressive) TPP, the 
Ardern government got some, but not all, 
of the changes it was seeking. This was a 
typical bargain where nobody emerged 
completely satisfied with the outcome. 
Even though the coalition has been 
engaging in a little bit of protectionism of 
its own, it was able to say that in supporting 
the revised agreement New Zealand 
remained a friend of economic openness. 
The risk had been averted that in her first 
major regional visit, to Vietnam for the 
APEC summit, the new prime minister 
would signal a significant reduction in New 
Zealand’s role in regional economic 
diplomacy.
Yet some bigger clouds on the trade 
policy horizon may present New Zealand 
with a regional picture unknown to any of 
Ardern’s recent prime ministerial 
predecessors. Donald Trump is now 
threatening to impose tariffs on major 
trading partners with whom the United 
States has a deficit. Many of Washington’s 
security allies – Canada, many other NATO 
partners in Europe, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and Australia – have been on the 
receiving end of these threats, although 
some of them have sought exclusions for 
themselves. But all along Trump’s big target 
was China, and as this article was being 
finalised the president was engaged in the 
early stages of what many fearful onlookers 
have depicted as an embryonic trade war. 
Even if that more extreme situation is 
avoided, almost any level of tariff escalation 
between the United States and China is bad 
news for New Zealand’s prospects. If these 
two leading economies define their 
economic relationship through a 
mercantilist lens, disregarding the mutual 
benefits of economic interdependence, the 
signals for the world economy in which 
New Zealand makes its living will be 
unmistakably negative. When Trump was 
taking a protectionist line on the campaign 
trail, Xi claimed that China was the new 
champion of economic globalism. But the 
more that Trump tries to push China 
around, the more that Xi will be inclined 
to focus on China’s prestige as a great 
power which can respond in kind.
In that sort of tussle, smaller, trade-
dependent countries like New Zealand will 
worry about the future of a trading order 
based on restraint around common rules 
and understandings. And if Mr Trump 
decides that Washington can live without 
the World Trade Organization – the central 
pillar of that system of rules – one of the 
foundations of New Zealand’s global 
connections will have been put at risk. It is 
hard to imagine a shift by Washington away 
from the fabric of global governance, aside 
from withdrawing from the United Nations 
itself, which could attract graver concerns 
from Wellington. 
Who is stepping up and stepping in? 
As the United States steps back from 
international economic leadership, some 
of New Zealand’s other leading partners 
have been trying to fill some of the 
vacuum. These include the European 
Union (EU) and Japan, who have agreed 
between themselves to a major free trade 
agreement. As well as the prospect of 
New Zealand–Japan free trade relations 
in a completed CPTPP, making progress 
towards a free trade agreement between 
New Zealand and Europe is part of the 
Ardern government’s negotiating agenda. 
But this will take time and it will not be 
easy to extract the agricultural concessions 
that New Zealand will be seeking. Unlike 
the prospects for a bilateral free trade 
agreement with the United Kingdom, the 
EU trading relationship was not mentioned 
in the prime minister’s big speech (Ardern, 
2018a). 
As America’s commitment falters and 
the United Kingdom is consumed by Brexit, 
New Zealand will welcome signs that other 
liberal democracies are keen to sustain an 
open trading order. Wellington will not 
want its Western partners to leave the stage 
to China. Many of New Zealand’s regional 
trading partners will remember China’s 
important contribution to their economic 
futures 20 years ago during the Asian 
financial crisis. They would have suffered 
even more from the more recent global 
financial crisis, which began with a 
meltdown in US housing securities, had it 
not been for the engine of growth that 
China’s economy has become. Like New 
Zealand, many Asia–Pacific countries are 
participating in China’s Belt and Road 
initiative and Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. These are further signs 
of China’s growing clout.
Like its predecessors, the Ardern 
government will be attracted to the benefits 
that a growing China provides to New 
Zealand’s region. But the era of American 
indifference to its international com-
mitments poses additional challenges for 
this approach. If New Zealand’s default 
strategy has been to say yes to initiatives 
from both China and the United States so 
as to encourage an equilibrium between 
As America’s commitment falters and 
the United Kingdom is consumed by 
Brexit, New Zealand will welcome signs 
that other liberal democracies are keen 
to sustain an open trading order.
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them, that strategy will now need to be 
revisited. There are now increased risks to 
New Zealand of being seen as beholden to 
China – and impressions count for a lot in 
these matters. But simply cutting back on 
connections with China is hardly an option. 
One can hardly imagine a New Zealand 
government that would decide, for 
example, not to seek an upgraded free trade 
agreement with Beijing. 
Yet New Zealand cannot ignore the 
obvious signs that a more powerful China 
is producing complex and unsettling effects 
whose impact will increasingly be felt. The 
Communist Party of China, which now 
appears to have Xi Jinping as its permanent 
head, wants to silence alternative political 
voices. Its approach to freedom of 
expression and to the openness of the 
internet run contrary to the views of New 
Zealand and other democracies. The more 
that Beijing, sometimes in conjunction 
with Moscow, encourages other 
governments to celebrate non-liberal 
political norms, the less this will work for 
New Zealand’s interests and values. 
New Zealand has been somewhat 
cautious in taking public stands against 
non-democratic politics, at least when this 
means criticising great powers on their 
human rights records. The new prime 
minister’s speech to the New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs gave the 
impression of breaking new ground by 
indicating that under her government New 
Zealand would not hesitate to raise with 
China its different views on ‘human rights, 
pursuing our trade interests, or the security 
and stability of our region’ (Ardern, 2018a). 
But any notion that this represents a 
significant pushback on China is likely to 
be premature. There is no sign, moreover, 
that New Zealand is willing to join a US-led 
chorus identifying China as lying outside 
the international order. 
Upholding international rules
This brings to mind the third main area 
of foreign policy challenge for the new 
government: how Ardern’s team will 
approach the promotion and protection 
of the systems and groups of rules of 
international conduct which have served 
New Zealand’s interests so well. This sits 
right in the middle of Labour’s traditional 
foreign policy agenda. Support for 
international law, negotiated settlements 
of international crises, a strong United 
Nations, and multilateral approaches to 
complex issues are all part of the foreign 
policy DNA that Ardern has inherited as 
the party’s (and the country’s) new leader. 
But the international rules, formally 
instituted as well as informally observed, 
that have worked so well for New Zealand 
are being challenged in multiple directions. 
Many of these problems were doc-
umented by National-led governments of 
the Key–English era. For example, New 
Zealand’s 2016 Defence White Paper drew 
attention to Russia’s violation of the rules 
of sovereignty in its annexation of Crimea 
and intervention in Ukraine (New Zealand 
Government, 2016, p.32). At this time New 
Zealand held one of the temporary seats 
on the UN Security Council, where it was 
an enormous struggle to get great power 
consensus on which restraints, rules and 
sanctions should apply to the various 
parties causing humanitarian distress in 
Syria. And the battlefield defeat of ISIS does 
not mean that transnational terrorism, and 
the damage it does to basic rules of justice 
and civility, has departed from the 
international scene. 
Other challenges abound. The 
willingness and capacity of many states to 
accord refugees and asylum seekers their 
full rights under international law has been 
reduced as populist nationalism rises in 
many places, often in tandem with national 
security concerns. The fabric of arms 
control, which has helped regulate strategic 
relations between the United States and 
Russia, is under severe strain. Finding new 
rules for emerging areas of potential 
cooperation and competition is not being 
made any easier in this divisive climate of 
international opinion. That includes, of 
course, climate change itself – although, in 
withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, the 
Trump administration has turned the 
United States into a solitary dissenter rather 
than a leader of a strong pack of holdouts. 
The emerging areas also include cyber 
security, where very different notions of 
government–civil society relations and 
rights are competing for influence.
Interstate relations in the Asia–Pacific 
region seldom emphasise formal rules and 
deeply institutionalised processes of 
negotiation. One might wonder if 
Wellington can therefore relax in the face 
of arguments that the rule-making and 
keeping part of the international order is 
being undermined. But a quick survey of 
regional developments suggests otherwise. 
For example, South East Asian 
multilateralism, to which New Zealand 
attaches great importance in its regional 
engagement (McKinnon, 2016, pp.31–3), 
prescribes the avoidance of force in 
international disputes along the lines of the 
UN Charter. And while China has preferred 
generally non-violent forms of pressure to 
pursue its aims in the South China Sea, its 
approach still clashes with widely 
understood views of Beijing’s obligations 
under international law. Washington’s 
criticism of China’s approach, which has 
been stepped up in 2018, would be more 
convincing if the Senate had ratified 
America’s signature to the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, whose importance 
will only grow as competition for maritime 
influence and resources expands. While 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing 
is in violation of obligations to the Security 
The willingness and capacity of 
many states to accord refugees and 
asylum seekers their full rights under 
international law has been reduced 
as populist nationalism rises in many 
places, often in tandem with national 
security concerns.
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Council, an American decision to use 
preventive force against North Korea would 
still be widely seen as contrary to 
international law.
Encouraging rules-based behaviour is 
also important closer to home. New 
Zealand’s hopes for order in the South 
Pacific rest in part on regional consensus 
at the Pacific Islands Forum. This has made 
Fiji’s challenge to that institution’s 
prominence an issue of some concern. That 
consensus may be an important issue if the 
region is soon faced with unsettling 
political developments in New Caledonia 
and Bougainville. In terms of regulating the 
role of powerful external actors, establishing 
rules of the road for the responsible 
distribution of overseas aid monies by the 
major powers (including China) in the 
Pacific is a continuing priority for 
Wellington. This was hinted at, rather than 
directly addressed, in Winston Peters’ 
speech in Sydney at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy with the argument that 
New Zealand, Australia, the US and the EU 
(i.e. traditional Western donors) ‘need to 
better pool our energies and resources to 
maintain our relative influence’ (Peters, 
2018).
Further south, New Zealand’s interests 
are bound up inextricably with the 
Antarctic Treaty system, whose regulatory 
capacity is being challenged as several large 
states seek greater presence and possibilities 
for resource exploitation. An echo can 
sometimes be heard of Arctic developments, 
where climate change is opening up new 
navigation possibilities before there is 
consensus on how the new possibilities for 
competition can be managed.
In many of these issue areas New 
Zealand is a stakeholder in systems of rules 
that have often reflected Western influence 
on international relations since the Second 
World War. This doesn’t mean Wellington 
has been unable or unwilling to 
accommodate new sources and types of 
rules and institutions. Even more 
importantly, it does not mean that as rising 
powers come onto the scene they have 
necessarily sought to replace existing 
systems of rules with brand-new approaches 
reflecting completely contradictory 
interests. Some of the apparent challengers 
to the status quo have done very well out 
of the existing rules: China’s profitable 
embrace of economic globalisation is one 
such example. Another example is the 
liking that so many newer nation states 
have for old-fashioned ideas about national 
sovereignty, a quintessential foundation of 
the system of states. And even when rising 
powers use the United Nations to pursue 
divisive objectives, they are still using a set 
of institutions that were part of the post-
war consensus on the greater need for 
global governance.
This external environment poses some 
important questions for the values-based 
foreign policy that Prime Minister Ardern 
has been seen to emphasise (Sachdeva, 
2018). On one hand, there is the question 
of which areas are most likely to be 
responsive to a degree of extra engagement 
by New Zealand, so that there is some 
effective action to go alongside the lofty 
rhetoric. On the other hand, there is the 
issue of who New Zealand’s values-based 
partners are likely to be on any issue. At 
least on security issues, the Key–English 
years were marked by a growing emphasis 
on cooperation with New Zealand’s Five 
Eyes partners. A Labour-led coalition 
government supported by the Greens 
would seem less likely to hold to that 
conservative assumption. By the same 
token, the make-up of the Ardern–Peters 
coalition may complicate New Zealand’s 
ability to show solidarity with its Western 
partners on the challenges posed by 
Vladimir Putin’s Russia to the rules of 
international conduct (Radio New Zealand, 
2018). 
Regional partners? 
Quite who the Ardern government’s main 
international partners will be is a particular 
challenge in Asia, where so many polities 
are becoming distinctly less progressive. 
The default answer, resorted to regularly by 
Wellington in the past, is to emphasise New 
Zealand’s engagement with the multilateral 
forums which have grown up around the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
But in practice these forums have had 
a limited purchase on the region’s most 
contentious and difficult issues, including 
maritime territorial disputes. Too many of 
the hard issues continue to be deflected in 
the search for consensus. 
For some time New Zealand has needed 
to boost and broaden its Asia–Pacific 
bilateral connections in Asia (beyond its 
strong relationships with China and the 
United States). Some of this was beginning 
to take shape in the later years of the Key–
English era, but hardly in a revolutionary 
or surprising fashion. Enhancing New 
Zealand’s already close relationship with 
Singapore, a leading interlocutor, has been 
one such priority. This will likely appeal to 
the new government, with the possible 
exception of the idea of basing Singaporean 
fighter aircraft in New Zealand.
The second priority has been Japan, 
touted in the last white paper as a fellow 
supporter of the rules-based order (New 
Zealand Government, 2016, p.34). This is 
an important country with which New 
Zealand’s security relationship is relatively 
undeveloped. The prime minister has given 
little indication that Japan features 
prominently in her view of the world 
(Capie, 2018; McLachlan, 2018). How 
much her government will focus on Tokyo 
will depend partly on its appetite for risk, 
given the competition between Japan and 
China. It will probably make sense for New 
Zealand to be cautious about one of Shinzo 
Abe’s signature foreign policy ideas: an 
Indo-Pacific strategic partnership between 
Asia’s maritime democracies involving 
For some time New Zealand has needed 
to boost and broaden its Asia–Pacific 
bilateral connections in Asia (beyond its 
strong relationships with China and the 
United States). 
The Ardern Government’s Foreign Policy Challenges
Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 2 – May 2018 – Page 23
Australia, India and the United States 
alongside Japan. The division of the region 
by regime type does not suit New Zealand’s 
inclinations or interests; nor does the 
prospect of encouraging the perception 
that Wellington seeks China’s containment.
Aside from these two partners, there 
aren’t too many other obvious choices in 
Asia. South Korea has moved in a more 
progressive direction under President 
Moon, but is very focused on problems on 
the peninsula. In April 2018, New Zealand 
received a rare visit from an Indonesia 
president. The shortage of attention given 
to this important event (Rabel, 2018) 
indicates that we should not get carried 
away in any expectations for growth in New 
Zealand’s relations with South East Asia’s 
largest and most important country. 
Elsewhere the prospects do not seem 
especially bright. Malaysia, Thailand and 
the Philippines are beset by various 
domestic concerns. By comparison, 
Vietnam is remarkably stable, and has 
precious insights into the art of pursuing 
national interests during times of increasing 
geopolitical competition. But, despite the 
recent visit of Prime Minister Nguyen, 
there will be limits as to how much New 
Zealand would rely on a partnership with 
a one-party state in mainland South East 
Asia.
Australia’s importance
All of this has one obvious conclusion. 
New Zealand’s reliance on its bilateral 
partnership and alliance with Australia, 
still the most important relationship in 
Wellington’s approach to the region and 
to the world, is unlikely to diminish. 
For the Ardern government, facilitating 
trans-Tasman cooperation in many areas 
of common interest remains the first 
priority for New Zealand foreign policy. 
This suggests that it will be necessary to 
ensure that policy differences between New 
Zealand and Australia do not get in the way 
of a broader desire for collaboration. 
It is nothing new for Australia and 
New Zealand to adopt different approaches 
to the same foreign policy issue. If in the 
lead-up to last year’s general election in 
New Zealand, Wellington and Canberra 
had been taking different views on the 
treatment by other countries of asylum 
seekers and migrants, this would hardly 
be a significant issue for the trans-Tasman 
relationship. But New Zealand’s insistence 
that Australia agree to its offer to take 
some of the migrants which Australia had 
located on Manus Island in Papua New 
Guinea was too easily seen as an attempt 
by Wellington to influence Canberra’s 
domestic policy in a very sensitive area. 
This was compounded by concern within 
Malcolm Turnbull’s government that the 
New Zealand Labour Party and the 
Australian Labor Party (both still in 
opposition) were in some sort of collusion 
at a time when the Liberal–National 
coalition had a very delicate hold on 
power in the federal Parliament. 
Jacinda Ardern came into office with an 
even stronger commitment to raise this 
issue than had been seen under Bill English. 
The passions some New Zealanders feel 
about Australia’s treatment of asylum 
seekers had been compounded by concerns 
that New Zealand expatriates have been 
treated unfairly in their access to Australian 
government assistance. Australia’s policies 
had become a larger factor within New 
Zealand domestic politics, and vice versa. 
An early test of this problem came with 
Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop’s 
visit to meet with her trans-Tasman 
counterpart, Winston Peters. Bishop was 
on record for suggesting before New 
Zealand’s general election that the Turnbull 
government might find it hard to work 
with a New Zealand Labour government. 
But there were no obvious fireworks. Peters 
made possible an informal Auckland 
meeting between Bishop and Ardern, who 
would soon be in Australia to meet Turnbull 
and to reaffirm that Australia was 
‘New Zealand’s indispensable international 
partner’ (Ardern, 2018b). 
The South Pacific: venue for a progressive 
turn?
At that very time, Peters himself was 
speaking in Sydney extolling Australia’s 
role in the South Pacific as New Zealand’s 
preferred partner there (Peters, 2018). 
This is one part of the world where New 
Zealand knows Australia depends on its 
involvement. Of course, the reverse is also 
true, and it applies beyond the immediate 
region, including currently in Iraq, where 
New Zealand forces are working with 
their Australian colleagues. But the profile 
of Australia–New Zealand collaboration 
in their nearer neighbourhood depends 
partly on events. It would be churlish to 
suggest that what they both need is a Pacific 
crisis to remind them of their mutual 
dependence. And there are also always 
going to be risks of divergence. This could 
occur if an Ardern government is tempted 
to burnish its progressive credentials as a 
South Pacific leader which understands 
the concerns of small states in a way that a 
security-focused Australia may not. 
One opportunity, which could also be 
a risk in terms of the Australian relationship, 
is to promote New Zealand as a champion 
of Pacific small state concerns about 
climate change. This might play well as a 
component of Ardern’s argument that 
climate change is this generation’s version 
of the anti-nuclear movement (Ewing, 
2017). The part of that movement that 
grew in New Zealand drew on concerns 
about nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 
But as students of New Zealand’s foreign 
policy history also know, New Zealand’s 
nuclear free crescendo also benefited from 
the existence of two major-power testers of 
nuclear weapons, France and the United 
States. There is no comparable focus for 
... as students of New Zealand’s foreign 
policy history also know, New Zealand’s 
nuclear free crescendo also benefited 
from the existence of two major-power 
testers of nuclear weapons, France and 
the United States.
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opposition in the case of climate change 
which can mobilise a corresponding level 
of resistance and energy. The problem is 
more diffuse. Persuading Washington to 
return to the climate change table, for 
example, is absolutely no guarantee of 
sufficient levels of mitigation of this global 
problem.
The recent history of New Zealand 
foreign policy also suggests that 
governments don’t often get to choose in 
advance the crises and challenges around 
which their most important decisions will 
be made. Who in the Clark government 
when it came into office in 1999 would have 
thought that within two years New Zealand 
would be joining an international coalition 
in Afghanistan following a terrorist attack 
on the United States? The resulting 
improvement in relations between 
Wellington and Washington was the most 
important Clark-era diplomatic 
achievement alongside the completion of 
New Zealand’s free trade agreement with 
China. We cannot tell from the state of the 
world in 2018 or from the make-up of the 
new coalition government what the Ardern 
era’s main foreign policy contribution will 
be. It may not be a single thing. And it may 
be hardly noticeable. But to have 
encouraged New Zealand’s Asia–Pacific 
partners to prefer peace to war, trade to 
protectionism, and the rule of law to the 
law of the jungle, even in small ways, might 
just be enough.
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